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CHAPTER I

THE DIMENSIONS OF FREEDOM

The problem of freedom is at the center of modern political thought.
The central question is how to combine order with freedom.

Black lib

eration and white reaction, hostility to the social structure and Spiro
Agnew's attack upon intellectuals and students and the question of war
and the draft all relate to the problem of man's struggle to be free.
The problem of freedom is new.
cerned with this problem.

Plato and Aristotle were not con

Plato was concerned with justice and the

ordering of the political community.

Aristotle talked of freedom but

was concerned with change and order and a potential world in which order
would exist.

Pericles was concerned with participation in political

life but his concept of political participation did not extend to the
liberal concept of freedom from the state or the Christian concept of
psychological freedom.

Nor was it of interest in the medieval corpor

ate state where men thought of themselves in terms of groups and classes
rather than as individuals.
The ideal freedom in the West developed with the emergence of the
idea that each man is an individual separate from the group and that
freedom is personal and related to the individual self.
this concept are found in Christian thought.

The roots of

It emerged with the col

lapse of medieval society and the rise of capitalism.
Freedom is restricted in two ways.

First, it is restricted by co

ercion and manipulation from outside the individual personality.

1
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coercion nay come in the form of government or private violence or in
group pressure to conform.

It is overt.

Manipulation is less obvious

and comes from both public and private sources through propaganda and
group pressure designed to influence opinion and control activity.

Free

dom from manipulation and coercion is sought by individuals to the ex
tent that they recognize these restrictions upon freedom.
Sensitivity to coercion and manipulation is most acute for those
attuned to the aesthetic dimensions of human life.

Thus the anti-autho-

itarian rebellion of modern America is led by those who are most aware
of the value of freedom of sensual experiences and artistic creativity.
The struggle against manipulation and coercion is a struggle for nega
tive freedom.

Negative freedom implies restrictions upon the sources

of manipulation and coercion.
A second threat to freedom is internal.

The psychological needs

and drives of human beings cause man to surrender his freedom to author
itarian figures or to seek domination over others.

Fromm'*' tells us that

in its extreme political form, masochists submit totally to the author
ity of the state or a dictator and sadists glorify in the domination and
persecution of minority groups and weaker nations.

Freedom from this

internal threat is called psychological freedom.

Negative Freedom

Negative freedom or freedom from external control is threatened by
man's need for security.

Freedom is threatened because we recognize that

iFromm, Erich, Escape From Freedom. New York:
and Winston, 1968, 140.

Holt, Rinehart,
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freedom without physical security is dangerous.

Sartre.-*- recognizes this

as he discusses the threat of one individual to another.

Hobbes finds

that freedom leads to anarchy which ultimately destroys the most basic
freedom, freedom of life.

To preserve freedom of life, Hobbes advocates

the surrender of all freedoms than life.

Total government with its co

ercive and manipulative aspects would preserve life by the destruction
of less crucial freedoms.

Freedom under total government is lost with

one exception that the right of government to destroy life is negated.
Liberal political theorists immediately began to expand Hobbes'
view of security to extend the sphere of freedom beyond freedom to life.
They recognized the threat of state coercion to extended freedom and
argued that the state must guarantee a wider variety of human freedoms.
This led to the concept of natural rights and bills of rights.

Still,

the power of the state and the importance of order remain central to the
liberal view of freedom.
ferred to anarchy.

Order with its inevitable restrictions is pre

Freedom must be sacrificed to some extent for secur

ity or freedom will be lost completely.
comes an impossibility.

To liberals, total freedom be

Thus one must accept limitations upon physical

action and turn to other concepts of freedom or embrace the dangers
of anarchy.

One alternative to anarchy is to conceive freedom to be a

psychological phenomenon at least partially independent of physical co
ercion.

^Sartre, Jean-Paul, Being and Nothingness. Boston: Beacon Press,
1956, 547.
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Psychological Freedom

The study of human personality confirms that man's enemy is his
own destructiveness.

Negative freedom is the result of restrictions

placed upon institutions and groups which seek to enslave individuals.
The ultimate failure of the "negative approach" to freedom has been the
inability of its advocates to recognize the psychological aspects of the
freedom problem.

Historically, we have seen freedom movements, again

and again, become authoritarian and oppressive.

Those who deny the

facist potential of the New Left are as blind to reality as the selfrighteous defenders of the old order.

Niebuhr’s^- "children of light"

have failed to recognize the evil that lurks within their own person
alities .
Negative freedom only blunts the destructive expression or internal
fears and hostilities.

All men are susceptible to unconscious drives

and forces leading to the elimination of restraints and the destruction
of all freedoms.

Politically, the least stable and most dangerous per

sonalities are the authoritarian and the anti— authoritarian personali
ties.
Adorno^ described the authoritarian personality as one which adheres
rigidly to conventional values and condemns those who violate his values.

ness.

^Niebuhr, Reinhold, The Children of Light and the Children of Dark
New York:
Scribner and Sons, 1958, 163.

2 A d o m o , Theodor W . , Else Frankel-Brunswik, Daniel J. Levinson,
and Nevitt Sanford, The Authoritarian Personality.
New York:
Harper,
1950, 759-62.
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He submits uncritically to the strong leaders of
to dominate those weaker than himself.

ingroups and seeks

He projects his troubles to

scapegoats and thinks in terms of stereotypes and superstitions.

In

contrast, the anti-authoritarian personality irrationally opposes all
standards and commands supported by authorities.
The authoritarian personality is deficient in psychological freedom
because he represses his hostility to authority figures.
channels all his aggressions toward outgroups.

Instead, he

Because of his simpli

fied concept of the world, he is unable to face the ambiguities and other
anxiety-provoking aspects of reality.

The anti-authoritarian personality

is deficient in psychological freedom because he refuses to recognize
his own weakness and dependency needs.

He conceives all authorities to

be wicked and all weak people to be exploited and persecuted.
is prone to black-white thinking.

He, too,

He cannot tolerate complexity or am

biguity in the world and becomes self-righteous about violations by others
of his particular value structure.

It appears clear that much of America's

"silent majority" shares the authoritarian personality type while the New
Left and other radical elements tend toward the anti-authoritarian type.
Psychological freedom, then, may be defined as the absence of the
subconscious fears and hostilities found in authoritarian and anti-auth
oritarian types.

The modern question of freedom is a struggle for both

internal and external freedom.

Existentialism is deeply involved in this

struggle and it is at this point that existentialism contributes to the
political theory of freedom.
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The Existentialist Perspective

Existentialist thought is often misunderstood as a contribution
to the dialogue of freedom because of its abstract terminology.

It

emphasizes particular human experiences in which it conceives the full
dimensions of human life to become visible and which may clarify the
problem of identifying what freedom really is as well as leading man
to that freedom.
There is a place for rationality in these experiences although they
cannot be fully grasped by reason alone.

Rather than being emotional,

existentialism is a personalistic philosophy in the sense of always being
concerned with the whole, the living person.

It emphasizes the experi

ences of contingency, anxiety, and despair, because they are important
parts of the life of each person.

Each of these experiences is partic

ularly relevant to the existentialist concept of freedom.
Contingency is the realization that man has been born into a strange
world and that he will soon die.

To the existentialist, this notion of

contingency leads m a n to freedom from death.
frees man psychologically from its restraints.

The recognition of death
Through knowledge of

death, the existentialist transforms it into the great force which can
lead to an ennobling of m a n ’s life.

Thus, by giving finitude a central

place, existentialism converts death into an enhancement of life.

It

initiates m a n ’s wondering about the meaning of life, projects him out
of superficial comfort, and is the major challenge to authentic life.
Closely linked to contingency is the disposition of anxiety.

Ex

istentialists conceive anxiety according to behaviorist psychology, to
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result from maladjustment.

Man is unable to meet the problems of his

situation since he has not yet mastered the techniques of adjustment
made available by his society.

The consequence of this is m a n ’s fail

ure to gratify his needs to their fullest extent.

This anxiety is de

fined as the result of a lack of ability to conform.

It prevents man

from transcending the psychological restraints to freedom.
However, existentialists interpret anxiety to go beyond the in
ability to adjust to prevailing norms.

To them, behaviorists do not

understand that anxiety is also linked to an emerging awareness of
nothingness.

Nothingness is the awareness that contemporary institutions

and values are a hollow shell.

They contain no substance and have no

meaning to the finite individual who is alienated from them by his aware
ness that he is finite and helpless to assert his being or true essence
within the structure of society.
This experience is not one to be avoided.

Nothingness taken in

this sense becomes the great positive force in m an’s life through its
challenge to live authentically.

With it, anxiety is

no longer the

feeling of being threatened in o n e ’s psychological survival but is
transformed into a guide to what man is beyond his organic life.

Con

sequently, anxiety is the call to become oneself, rather than the signal
for an increased or improved conformity.

In this sense, anxiety is a

form of psychological freedom as the existentialist intuits his true
self and transcends his organic limitations to live the fullest life
by mastering his finitude and the anxieties produced by society.

He

becomes an authentic being by discovering and living his essence.
Existential despair is becoming aware of one's being alone in those

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

matters which, count most.

Man is lifted out of the security offered by

his social and political institutions to an awareness that where a man's
life is at stake, no other man and no human institution can lift the
burden of responsibility and decision from his shoulders.

Here man is

totally submerged in a whirlpool of freedom in which he alone can find
his way to an authentic existence.
This transition from dependence to authentic existence or essence
is difficult.

Ever since Kierkegaard, existentialists have spoken of

the leap into authentic existence.

This, leap occurs as a result of the

experience of contingency, anxiety, and despair, leading to an aware
ness of man's true condition and a determination to transcend social
and philosophical conformity to exercise true freedom or authentic ex
istence based on these experiences.
To existentialists, authentic existence is knowing and freedom
are synonymous.

Authentic existence might be better understood by an

alyzing Aristotle's concept of essence.

Aristotle is concerned with

the problem of discovering that which makes matter into a particular,
individual thing.

He concludes that each thing contains an essence

which is not another element in the thing nor anything compounded out
of its elements.

Thus he rejects any materialistic understanding of

the essence and treats it as the principle of structure of the con
crete thing.
Like Aristotle, the existentialist is concerned with the principle
of structure or essence of his individual self.

For him, authentic ex

istence is an awareness of and living of man's individual essence.
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experiences of contingency, anxiety, and despair occur when man begins
to realize that he has been denied realization of his authentic existence
or essence and serves to bring awareness of that essence.

This aware

ness breaks the existentialist away from all the psychological restric
tions that have been integrated into him through society and thrusts
him into the openness of true freedom which is the crucial point in all
existentialist works.

This true freedom is not one blessed moment of

conversion but a style of life in which despair and authenticity are
never far distant from each other.
Aristotle’s concepts of becoming, potential, and actuality also are
analogous to existentialist thought.

Aristotle is interested in the

potentiality in a single thing of passing from one state to another.
Essentially, he holds that before "A" actually was in the state "B" it
must have been potentially so.
out potentiality.

To him, change cannot be explained with

Existentialists are in agreement with this position.

A major concern of existentialism is the passage of man from his contem
porary existence of unauthentic life to authentic living which is poten
tially his.

Indeed, it is the spark of potential freedom that creates

despair at the lack of freedom in man's existence and causes him to seek
authentic life.
Aristotle goes beyong awareness of the potential in man to argue
that change does not come by potentiality alone.

To him, nothing is

promoted from potentiality to actuality without the agency of something
actual and this actuality is the end to which potentiality points.
the existentialist, actuality is also the catalyst of change.

For

The actu-
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ality stimulating change from nonauthentic to authentic existence is
human experience including the three experiences discussed above.
Thus, like Aristotle, existentialists argue that man has the power of
initiating change and of becoming that toward which his potentiality
p oints.
Aristotle's concept of becoming which finds man to be moving from
what he is to what he potentially may be is also analogous to existen
tialist thought.

The man who is experiencing contingency, anxiety,

and despair has moved beyond man as unauthentic being and is in the
process of becoming authentic

man or reaching the immanent state.

This immanent state or potential, conceived differently, is existen
tialist thinking and is the major source of difference between Christian
and non-Christian existentialists.
The disagreement among existentialists on interpretation of auth
enticity is clear in the thoughts of Heidegger, Sartre, and Jaspers.
Heidegger^ finds estrangement to be a life detached from Being, which
is the mystical force or relationship of all those living in authentic
existence.

Authentic existence is the awareness that one is standing-

out from Being and finding a way home to it.

In this sense, Heidegger's

authentic existence is man becoming his highest potential which tran
scends individual potential to the essence of its structure or the
master plan of that essence.

Death is the great caller to such a life,

^Heidegger, Martin, Being and Time.
1962, 346.

New York:

Harper and Row,
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because through it man faces the mystery of Being in all earnestness.
For Sartre,^ authenticity is creation of meaning.

Like Nietzsche,

he wants man to know himself to be alone and without support from God.
To be authentic is to be creative in spite of the ultimate futility
of creation.

Jaspers

2

calls man to an authenticity which is essen

tially a determination continuously to journey; the aim being variously
called the encompassing, transcendence, and God.

To affirm wholly,

yet nevertheless to go beyond this position and to affirm again end
lessly means to live authentically.

Others have interpreted the exis

tentialist breakthrough into the openness of freedom as one which
enables a true human experience of God.

The "I" really becomes "I"

by personally relating itself to God in freedom.

This is so in Kierke

gaard, Tillich, Marcel, Buber, and Berdyaev.
The importance of the existentialist call for authentic exis
tence cannot be overemphasized.

To existentialists, it constitutes

the rebirth of genuine individualism ?n a time which has lost the ardent
desire for it despite all outwardly expressed enthusiasm.

This con

cern for individual authenticity is a call for both psychological- and
negative freedom.

All subsequent existentialist commentary upon society,

man and the state have at their root the fear that social relationships
as we know them today destroy freedom and therefore frustrate man's
need to know his essence and to live authentically.

^op. cit., p. 62.

2

Jaspers, Karl, The Way to Wisdom.
1962, 47.

New York:

Harper and Row,
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CHAPTER i l

FREEDOM AND SOCIETY

The existentialist, despite the high priority he placed upon the
individual’s right to authentically express his personality free of
restraint or coercion or the opinions of other beings, recognizes that
the existing individual does not move in a vacuum and attempts an an
alysis of m a n ’s environment as it relates to him.

This chapter shall

address itself to the problem of freedom within the confines of society.
Existentialists, like most social scientists, clearly distinguish
between the terms "society" and "state".
is a lesser form of society.

They insist that the state

It is separate from society in organiza

tion and purpose but not in conflict with society.

The state serves

social institutions and the goals of society by using violence and the
threat of force to stabilize those institutions and subject the will
of the individual to the general will of society.

The public media,

belief in systems and the fear of individuals to become socially os
tracized by refusing to conform,also serve to subject the will of the
individual to society.

Thus, the struggle for freedom is more than

a struggle from the state.

At its roots, it is a struggle between

the individual and society.
Existentialists find society to be an abstract concept.

Men re

late together to form a group or society and relate to society as an
empirical reality apart from its individual members.

In contrast,

existentialists find groups to have no empirical reality.

Society

12
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is composed of individuals who by glorification of the group merge
their identities with this abstract concept.
his true identity.

In this sense man loses

Thus the danger to individual freedom is for indi

vidual man to identify himself with this abstract concept rather than
to recognize himself as an individual subject to individual empirical
experiences and capable of authentic existence.
All existentialist thinkers fear society because of this belief
that society robs man of his sense of individual reality.

Kierkegaardl

deplored life in the age of abstraction and was joined by Heidegger^
who warned that relationships with others causes man to forget his
authentic existence.

He found the forces of society to impersonalize

man and mold his personality to that of society in general.

Faced

3
with this problem, Heidegger
as an abstraction.

finds that authentic man cannot live

He must choose between subjecting himself to some

abstract concept of man or asserting his authenticity by withdrawing
from society.
Existentialists fear society and find it to pervert authentic
man for several reasons.

First, the abstraction of man which forces

him to surrender his empirical reality to the abstract concept of a
social whole makes him susceptible to the evils of the mass media.

Kierkegaard, Soren, The Present A g e . Translated by Alexander
Dru and Walter Lowrie.
London: Oxford University Press, 1949, 3.

2

Heidegger, Martin, Being and Existence.
Company, 1959, 27.

Chicago:

Henry Regnery

^loc. cit., p. 124.
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In society, the mass media function to maintain the whole and to con
tinue the process of separating man in society from his unique self.
Kierkegaard'*' notes this as he deplores the mass media for substituting
gossip or verbosity for genuine action.

To him, the circulation of

newspapers is an indicator of the extent to w h ich freedom has oeen
destroyed because freedom is found in the authentic inwardness of man
and the mass media is a wholly external mode of discourse,
A second characteristic of society w h i c h served to dehumanize
man by depriving him of his freedom is its tendency toward egalitari
anism.

Egalitarianism, like the mass media, represents the abstract

quality of public life and contributes to it.

Kierkegaard

2

sees the

egalitarianism of the m o d e m age to be a levelling process which rep
resents the victory of the abstract over empirical existence.
the victory of the public over the individual.

It is

This public, he

finds

consists of unreal individuals who never are and never
can be united in an actual situation - and yet are held
together as a whole.
To Kierkegaard, reduction from status as a man to become one of equals
composing an abstraction is the antithesis of freedom.
Heidegger

4

finds that the egalitarianism of society creates im-

personality since we are all alike and thus interchangeable.

Reduc-

■^op. cit., p. 52.
^loc. cit., p. 53.
^loc. cit., p. 38
er, Martin, Being and Existence, op. cit., p. 31-
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tion to equals creates a categorical imperative to behave like every
one.

This too, is a denial of the freedom to be creative.

Jaspers

also fears the levelling process as detrimental to human freedom.

To

him^ the elimination of differences means the debasement of the superior
to the average.
superficial.

Thus he finds that the universal is always the most

Yet, says Jaspers, we doggedly pursue this process in

the hope that we may bring about the unification of mankind.
Marcel

2

agrees w i t h Jaspers.

To him, the attempt to obliterate

genuine distinctions is necessary to bring man to identify with the
public or group will.

Thus society drives to render illegal former

liberties which have come to be considered intolerable privileges.
These privileges are suppressed until the situation of each individual
resembles that of his neighbor.

To Marcel, society fears individual

liberties as anarchic in terms of its stability and seeks to suppress
human freedom.
A third characteristic of society endangering freedom is its
emphasis upon acceptance of certain types of ideologies.

These ideol

ogies reduce fear and funnel individuals into an abstraction as they
identify with the system rather than their own empirical experiences.
The confidence given to the individual by acceptance of a philosopher
system negates such experiences as contingency, anxiety, and despair
which are necessary prerequisites to total freedom.

J a s p e r s , Karl, The Origin and Goal of History.
University Press, 1958, 96.,
^Marcel, Gabriel, The Philosophy of Existence.
Press, 1949, 64.

New Haven: Yale

Boston;

Beacon
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Existentialists find these ideologies or closed systems of thought
to block freedom for several reasons.

First, they believe that it is

impossible for m an to build a universally valid system of thought
which will enable hfm to v iew truth from the outside like any other
object.

Belief in a universally valid system, existentialists fear,

will give man a false sense of security and spare him anxiety and
despair which lead to awareness of his condition and authentic exis
tence in freedom.

Second, they find such systems to breed intolerance

and to seduce people into imagining themselves in possession of abso
lute truth which results in religious and political suppression and
injustice.

Nationalism is an example of this problem.

Third, even if fanaticism and intolerance should be avoided, ex
istentialists fear that closed systems or ideologies breed lack of
interest in further questioning one's life.

This attitude, as Buber1

y*

puts it, "...is one of satisfaction that one has built a house in which
one can live comfortably from now on, and from which one can look out
upon the world w i t h curiosity but without serious concern,"

In this

view, instead of being an adventure, life turns into a secondhand life
as most people do not create their own systems but merely accept them.
To the existentialist, even the creators of systems often just put
them together without ever involving their personalities wholeheartedly
in them.

Thus, acceptance of systems causes man's estrangement from

what he can be.

Tolstoy

2

sheds light on this alienation as he traces

^Buber, Martin, Between Man and Man.

Boston;

Bea,con Press, 1955,

144.
^Tolstoy, Leo, The Death of Ivan Ilych. New York; Oxford University
Press, 1960,
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the growth of Ivan Illyich from submission to a system to authentic
existence.
Central to this existentialist hostility toward closed systems
is a deep fear of social movements or "isms" which, seem, to the exis
tentialists, to afford a universal explanation of the world and thus
to offer to man comfort and security-

Through these systems man can

rest assured in a knowledge of the structure and aim of the world,
Furthermore, since the majority of these systems promised a necessarily
better future, one could also look forward to it w i t h great hopes and
expectations.

Moreover, existentialists saw these "isms" to hold that

all this could be achieved by merely changing the institutional organ
ization of society or social engineering.

All of these promises of

the systems could have only one effect, the denial of authenticity
to the individual who placed his trust in them and avoided the exis
tential crisis of despair followed by authentic existence through a
new freedom.
Obviously, extreme devotion to "isms" is not a characteristic of
all systems.

However, existentialists would argue that although all

intellectual systems do not incorporate all the evils demonstrated
to be characteristic of extreme systems, all systems do result is the
loss of individualism to a greater or lesser degree^

Thus the dis

tinction between systems is one of degree but all systems destroy
human freedom.
Existentialists find liberalism to be an example of such a closed
system.

They find liberals to serve their purposes to the extent that

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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they support negative freedom.

Yet, they criticize liberals for the

inability to realize that there are other restrictions upon freedom
in addition to the state.
Dostoevski

1

and Nietzsche

2

attach liberalism for three reasons.

First, they fear that it attempts to convert freedom and individuality
into a formula for achieving the best of everything.

Second, they

see liberalism as attempting to create a "utopia of happiness" by be
lief in the validity of the liberal model finding freedom in the bal
ance of individuals and groups with the state.

Third, they fear that

this utopia will encourage individuals to seek comfort and security
rather than face the reality of authentic existence in freedom.
Liberals and existentialist have much in common.
alism is a concern for the individual.
this concept.

Central to liber

Existentialists do not attack,

With the exception of those liberals who reduce man to

part of a great social machine or subject him to determinism, most
liberals seek individual freedom and openness and tolerance just as
existentialists do.

Indeed, in noting the merging of some liberal and

existentialist concerns, Hughes

3

has gone so far as to label Sartre

"an old-style European intellectual, perhaps the last truly great one
that the twentieth century was to see."

York:

Revealing Sartre's concern

^Dostoevski, Fedor, The Best Short Stories of Dostoevski.
The Modern Library, 1955, 133.

^Nietzsche, Friedrich, The Complete Works.
millan Company, 1911.
%.ughes, a. Stuart, "Jean-Paul Sartre:
Ramparts, June 1966, 48.

New York:

New

The Mac

The Marxist Phase,"
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for the oppressed and his liberal attitudes, Hughes found him to be
a liberal in the tradition of the great French moralists.

Existen

tialist criticism is aroused at the seeming inability of liberalism
to attack all restrictions upon freedom.

To existentialists, liberal

ism has failed to the extent that it has become a closed system based
upon a particular model of freedom rather than man's own creativity
in total freedom.
One of the problems of this existentialist criticism is its
failure to distinguish different types of liberalism.

For example,

many liberals would agree with the existentialists that public insti
tutions such as the press tend to direct and channel human thought
rather than promoting human creativity.
ist scholarship has been sloppy.

To this extent, existential

However, it is important to remember

that existentialists are addressing themselves to the problem of human
freedom and are not concerned with defending favorable aspects of
any system.

Existentialists recognize the importance of reason and

proper scholarship.

However, at its core, existentialism is an intro

spective humanism or theory of man which expresses the individual's
intense awareness of his contingency and freedom.

The existential

awareness of restriction within liberal society and within liberal
thought is sufficient in itself for condemnation of liberal thought.
To the existentialist, any attempt to structure or order human rela
tionships is anathema.

Any philosophy which orders human beings is

evil regardless of its fine qualities or its divisions of thought.
It might also be argued at this point that the tendency to lump
existentialists together regardless of the time in which they wrote,
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where they wrote, or their general political ideology, is not a good
thing.

For example, it seems strange to bring Dostoevski, Nietzsche,

Tolstoy, and Sartre together as they reflect upon liberalism.

Cer

tainly, Nietzsche's attitude toward liberalism takes the form that
it does less because he is an existentialist of some sort than because
he is a 19th century German intellectual who shares that groups prej
udices against liberalism.
The existentialist would respond to such criticism by noting that
existentialism, by its very nature, is not a systematic ideology amen
able to orderly division.

Rather, existentialism as a philosophy

is a disorderly collection of human responses toward restriction and
a series of individual attempts to express the totality of human free
dom.

Any author who expresses a criticism of human restriction or

desire for an increase in human freedom is an existentialist to the
degree of freedom he seeks and the extent to which he achieves the
authentic life.

Therefore, existentialists see no need to order their

thought in terms of time or any other division.

Such a systematic

approach would mute the individual's cry for freedom and violate the
existentialist emphasis upon the uniqueness of each individual exis
tence .
Existentialists are far less charitable toward nationalism as
a closed system than toward liberalism.

Existentialists find nation

alism to attempt to give man's life meaning by submerging him in the
group and totally dedicating his life to it.

Nietzsche"*" attacked

^-Nietzsche, Friedrich, The Complete Works.
1911, 140.

New York: Macmillan,
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nationalism as supporting the uncreative trends in man, his laziness
and fear.

For Nietzsche, the modern state represented no more than

a fairly complicated herd, against which individuals would have to
rise if they did not wish to be swallowed up.

Thus Nietzsche, like

other existentialists, viewed nationalism as not worthy to fill out
a m a n ’s life but actually as annihilating his life by making man a
state slave.
Existentialists do not clearly distinguish between Marxism and
socialism.

They tend to express a certain sympathy for what they see

to be existential aspects of Marxism and socialism but go on to reject
these schools of thought as additional systems of thought with the same
restrictions on freedom as other ideologies.
Existentialists find a wide gap between Marx's early probing
into a m a n ’s destiny and the consequent systematic orthodoxy of social
ism.

Berdyaev'*' finds Mar x ’s interpretation of capitalism from the

standpoint of its social relation to be existential in nature.

Marx's

more lasting contribution to existentialism is his research on the re
lationship between the individual and his economic environment.

He

adopted the factory worker as a symbol of how man could be estranged
from his existence as a human being.
in nature.

This is certainly existential

Existentialists find Marx to have revealed a cardinal

concept in existentialism as he discovered disharmony in the midst of
proclaimed progress as whole groups of persons became merely tools

■^Berdyaev, Nicolas, The Beginning and the End.

New York: 1952,

187.
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rather than persons.

This occurred as the m o d e m worker became subject

to a machine over which he had no effective control and which came to
engulf him through its control of his work.
Unfortunately, to existentialists, Marx attempted to solve this
existential problem by adopting Hegel’s idea of incorporating the prob
lem and its suggested solution into a vast system.

In it the idea or

world spirit of Hegel is replaced by the forces of production.

History

is determined as it moves toward the establishment of the social so
ciety where man will become fully man.

Thus, to the existentialists,

Marx has properly labled man's alienation but incorrectly found its
solution in a logical system leading toward a determined end.

As in

Hegel, history denies man the freedom to shape it, and the system with
its promise of happiness and security replaces the free man living in
authentic existence to shape his own destiny.
Nietzsche reacted violently against this Marxist system.

To him,-*-

the tragedy and paradox of this is that socialism which strives to use
society as a means to the ultimate happiness of the individual succeeds
in subjecting his individuality to the community.

Dostoevski

2

feared the subjection of man to the community under socialism.

also
He

feared that thousands of his fellow men might be killed in order to
usher in the "new era".

But tragically, to Dostoevski, after all the

destruction of life and property, instead of the ideal society would

"^Nietzsche, Friedrich, The Joyful Wisdom.
Co., 1924, 152.

York:

New York: Macmillan

^Dostoevski, Fedor, The Best Short Stories of Dostoevski.
The M o d e m Library, 1955, 138.
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appear one in which freedom had been sold for the comforts of food and
shelter.
Sartre is an exception to this existentialist attitude toward
Marxism.

In his Critique of Dialectical Reason, Sartre-*- engaged him

self with Marxism as an intellectual discipline.
join Marxism and existentialism.

Sartre sought to

He accused the Stalinists of turning

Marxism into a cult of fixed ideas and hoped that existentialism could
rejuvenate its existential nature.
In the Critique, Sartre

2

argued that scarcity places limitations

upon men and is the origin of violence.

Thus Sartre held that human

freedom is less complete than he had imagined when he had written Being
and Nothingness.

He now saw that freedom for scarcity became actual

only when men grouped themselves together for mutual assistance.
At this point, Sartre turned to terror as the instrument of po
litical action.

He^ spoke of terror as "the very bond of fraternity,"

and looked for isolated individuals to be fused into a group inspired
by a single aim.

To him, this revolutionary violence was both inev

itable and moral as m a n ’s freedom gave him a special license to con
done the terroristic practices of the revolutionary left.
Sartre’s attempted marriage of existentialism and Marxism was

^"Sartre, Jean-Paul, Critique of Dialectical Reason.
George Braziller, 1960, 48.
o

New fork:

loc. cit., p. 49.

^ibid.
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1
a failure.

As Hughes

has said:

It was neither Marxism nor social science - nor
did it offer the prolegomena to a new understand
ing of man. Both amateurish and old-fashioned,
it closed rather than inaugurated a major phase
in French intellectual history.
Four years later Sartre published The Words in which he seemed
to take back or refute much that his Marxism treatise had asserted.
He now saw that his striving toward universalism had the opposite
of the effect he had desired.

Thus Sartre moved closer to his orig

inal position and the approach of most existentialists to Marxism.
Further reference to Sartre in this thesis will refer to his preCritique contributions as descriptive of his position as an existen
tialist unless otherwise specified.
Existentialists also oppose any scientific or psychological ap
proach to the social sciences which suggests that man is not free to
make his own way in the world or that his actions are determined in
any way.

An example of the attitude they reject is seen in Skinner's

2

postulate that human action "is a lawful datum, that it is undisturbed
by the capricious acts of any free agent - in other words, that it is

3
completely determined."

In Skinner’s

Walden Two, the psychologist-

manager of his model community concedes that it might never be possi—

^op. cit., p. 51.
Kariel, Henry S., "The Political Relevance of Behavioral and
Existential Psychology," The American Political Science Review, LXI
No. 2 (Jhme 1967) 337-338 citing Skinner's Cumulative Record, 227.

3
Skinner, Benjamin F . , Walden T w o .

New York: Macmillan, 1948,

257.
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ble to prove that man is not free.

"But," his'*’ manager went on to say,

"...the increasing success of a science of behavior makes it more and
more plausible."
Buber,

2

like all existentialists, rejects any deterministic inter

pretation of man.

To him, the sciences are wrong.

Like Jaspers, he

views the sciences as practical and useful but unable to find the whole
meaning of human life.

Whenever the sciences set themselves up as the

last authority on m a n ’s needs and goals, they are outright harmful
and dangerous since they then become the main source for man's estrange
ment.

In line with all existentialist thought, Buber denies that a

system can swallow up the concrete and free individual.

To him, Darwin

with his biological interpretation of the world and Spengler with his
historical scheme both surrendered to a fate they themselves had de
signed.
To existentialists, closed systems of thought and world views
which take man's freedom from him are highly objectionable.

Subscrip

tion to these systems causes unauthentic existence which must be over
come.

This unauthentic existence finds man in the world to be driven

rather than to drive.

In it man has not yet overcome his estrangement

from what is truly human.

To remain in this state is not wortly of

a human being, since it is the denial of the great potentialities^of
man.

Existentialists see. doors by which to leave, this lowest level

■*-ibid.
2

op. ext.
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of human existence to be wide open for those who wish to use them.
They are opened by certain fundamental experiences shared by all man
kind.

The problem is that these systems of thought prevent man from

feeling those experiences.

They do this by causing him to view him

self as "driven," and to see himself as securely established within
a world view and sure of himself and the world.

They also do it by

encouraging him to conform to particular modes of thought and enticing
him to sacrifice the freedom which would have led to despair and aware
ness in exchange for material freedom.

The existentialist demand that

the full immediacy of such experiences as anxiety, risk, boredom,
despair, death, and nothingness be preserved.

Only then can they pro

vide the jolt necessary to project man out of his unauthentic existence
to true authenticity in freedom.
Society then, by providing false security through closed systems
of thought, egalitarianism, forced regimentation through the state,
and manipulated regimentation through the mass media, functions to
strip man of his uniqueness and merge his identity with that of an
abstract public.
society.

The alternative to this process is to withdraw from

Thus, individual man must become a social deviant to preserve

his freedom.

In effect, he becomes a rebel.
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CHAPTER III
FREEDOM AND REBELLION

The deviant in society represents the spirit of rebellion-

How

does society react to this individual who refuses to become a cog in
the great social machine and asserts his right to seek authenticity
through individualistic action?

The solution to this challenge to

society is the state which is authorized by the public to enforce the
will of society.

This raises a further question.

What is the obli

gation of the individual to authority and the state?

We shall seek

enlightenment on these questions by observing the state as an agency
of society, analyzing the existential perspective of morality and the
place of rebellion in the existentialist philosophy as represented by
Camus and Sartre.

The State: An Existentialist Perspective

In exploring the existentialist concept of the state we must note
that the state is given power by society.

This power has been placed

in the hands of the state on the premise that force or the threat of
force is necessary to the creation of an orderly society directed
toward accomplishing the general welfare through collective action.
Presumably, the state through its agencies, acts at the request of
society in the best interests of a majority of the individuals in so
ciety.

Unfortunately, to existentialists, this attempt to enforce

conformity restricts individual freedom and continues the levelling
process.

Thus, to accomplish the.good things resulting from organi-

27
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zation, it is necessary for the state to do bad things by directing
the dissenting individual against his will.

Thus existentialists find

any threat to tradition or convention to be stifled by the state in
support of the static-society.
This problem is not recognized by existentialists alone.
a widespread observation among many social scientists.

It is

Strauss"*" notes

that Augustine recognizes it as he discusses the problems of obeying
political authority and living the Christian life.

Paine

2

was not

unaware of the problem when, referring to the injustices done to the
individual by society, he commented that true social progress necessi3
tates less government.

Niebuhr

also found government to be an evil

necessary to maintaining an organized society.
The existentialist asserts that all through our social life we
are faced with the tragic fact that our means are defective even though
our ends might be good.

Government, meant to accomplish good things,

becomes the institutionalization of distasteful tasks and objection
able to the individual as an interference with human freedom.

The

draft would be an example of this as the state, representing the pub
lic, denies the individual his authenticity as it enslaves him to per
petrate an unauthentic and abstract society.

Therefore, to the exis

tentialist, every collective action can be seen to contain this defec-

'*'Strauss, Leo and Joseph Cropsey, History of Political Philosophy.
Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963, 154-58.
^loc. cit., p. 595.
3

o p . c i t .,
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tive element and threaten individual freedom.

Few can preserve their

integrity against society which is threatening to become a leviathan
fattening on the lost freedoms and possibilities of individuals.

To

existentialists, the state through organization and forced collective
action, substitutes its purposes for the integrity of the individual.

Morality and Authority

The existentialist concept of morality and truth is relevant to
our study because it determines the decision existentialists will make
in choosing whether or not to subject themselves to the authority of
the state.

Existentialists find that the state has traditionally justi

fied its monopoly of power by claiming to represent some universal
right or code of morality.

This morality has served as a strong in

centive for commitment to others and to the state.

Kings ruled by

divine right and politicians roused the masses to action by raising
the banner of God and righteousness.
In the view of existentialists, contemporary society forms the
notion of an overarching ethical system and men are required to live
according to the principles of that system.

Deviation from the system

is considered a violation of moral law or ethics and justifies action
on the part of the state to enforce conformity.
dodging is seen to be -immoral as well as illegal.

In this view, draft
Thus, failure to

comply to the norms of society is viewed as a violation of ethical
standards as well as customs.
Questioning this defense of authority, existentialism takes a
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relative approach, to the question, of ethics and the obligative rela
tionship of the individual to authority.

Williams^ finds contemporary

existentialism to hold that:
The way to truth and morality lies in and through
the experience of the self. The human being, in
his own deep inwardness, is the starting point
for arriving at any adequate knowledge of truth
and morality.
Vital truth, it is claimed, is
grounded in human subjectivity.
Existentialists, then, find truth and morality to be made rela
tive by the human nature.

The quest after truth and morality is
2

thought to be essentially the quest of the solitary individual.
said that "...subjectivity must be the starting point."

Sartre

Jaspers-5 found
4

the approach to truth to lie through one's own existence and Heidegger
found man to be the door to reality.

Thus, by asserting the relativity

of truth and morality, the existentialist denies that any one prin
ciple or set of ethics exists to which he owes obedience.

This leads

him to question the right of the state to limit the individual's possi
bilities and act as a coordinating power directing individuals in the
name of tradition and conformity.
This restrictiveness of the state is seen by existentialists to
inhibit the authenticity of those who wish to be free and construct

^Williams, J. Rodman, Contemporary Existentialism and Christian
Faith. Englewood Cliffs., New Jersey; Prentice Eall, 1965, 1,

man.

^Sartre, Jean-Paul, Existentialism.
Translated by Bernard Frecht—
New York: Philosophical Librairy, 1947, 15.
^Jaspers, Reason and Existence.

New York: Noonday, 1953, 102.

4
Heidegger, Martin, Existence and Being.
1949, 304.

Chicago: Henry Regnery,
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their own. morality and gives rise to the "freedom theme" which bubbles
up in the form of rebellion against any authority which violates this
freedom.

Nietzschels^ view of truth and construction of a "Higher

Han" is an example of one existentialist^ attempt to escape the
shackles of institutionalized morality which is based on the premise
that the collective will of society must reign as an absolute.

This

attempt to escape authority in search of authenticity is a major theme
in existentialism and repeated in many ways by all existentialist phil
osophers and social critics.
Thus, existentialists find that men need not obey the authority
of the state.

To them, the obligative power of the state should not

extend to the denial of freedom.

The individual must be free to seek

his authentic existence, even if his search jeopardizes the collective
security of society.

Rebellion
Existentialism can now be seen as a philosophy emphasizing indi
vidualism and non-conformity.

Consequently, all existentialists share

the belief that it is up to the individual himself to solve his own
existential problems.

Society cannot do it for him.

Society should

no longer designate him to fulfill a particular function and he is free
to seek his own perfection as an authentic being rather than a smooth
ly functioning cog in the great social machine.

Therefore, the exis

tentialist, seeking authentic existence, must rebel against the forces

Friedrich, Twilight of the Idols.

New York.: Macmillan

1911, 543.
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restricting him to unauthentic living.
The existentialist approach to rebellion may be divided into a
conservative and liberal approach.

In this investigation, we shall

distinguish liberal existentialism from conservative existentialism
by the degree to which each hopes to carry the existentialist rebel
lion and the scope of that rebellion.

All religious existentialists

support the basic conservative view while the secular existentialists
are divided.

Sartre and the liberal approach are synonymous.

Con

servatives are not as united in their views but Camus adequately rep
resents their position.
A comparison of the social and political positions of Sartre and
Camus reveals the split between conservative and liberal existential
ists.

The major area of divergence is in the meaning and result of

conflict which recurs as m en revolt against their objectification by
others either into systems or as individuals.

This difference is epit

omized in their distinctive ways of defining the concepts of revolt
as the rebellion of the individual who refuses to be a part of the
evils of society while asserting his own individual freedom and auth
enticity in a nonviolent way.
tive and liberal positions.

Sartre fluctuates between the conserva
At times, as a conservative, he asserts

that the individual stands alone and will loose his authenticity if
he participates in any collective activity.

In recent years, as a

liberal, Sartre has seen the necessity of collective action as groups
participate in revolution which can be violent.

This revolution is

a realistic program of action charted toward definite ends and moving
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with the course of history which, it directs and modifies.
This conflict can he seen in a survey of the fiction of Sartre and
Camus.

Frequently these two men create story situations where friends

represent divergent attitudes.

Neither man causes his characters to

clash head-on nor finally merge but Camus ultimately establishes a
kind of unity in difference, the balanced tension of the bow, whereas
in Sartre the conflict finally rends the two friends assunder and de
stroys at least one of them.
Unlike Sartre, Camus has gradually worked out a political phil
osophy of rebellion and stuck to it.
and of moderation.

His philosophy is one of limits

It does not advocate passivity but if violence

occurs, it is not legitimized.
and personal responsibility.

It is the result of calculated risk
One may resort to any violence only as

an extreme limit which is opposed to another extreme violence.

To

Camus,^ "The authentic action of revolt will consent to take up arms
only for institutions which limit violence, not for those which codify
it."

Just as the philosophy of revolt seeks a dynamic mean between

violence and absolute nonviolence, so it holds that justice and freedom
must find their limits with each other.

Neither the real nor the ideal

must be pursued at the expense of the other.

To justify action and

systems in the name of what it is, denies man's transcendence and en
chains him to the material world.

The rebel, for Camus, must be like

the artist, who squarely confronts reality without escaping from it.
Revolt is uncompromising as to means but will accept approximation in

■'■Camus, Albert, The Rebel.

N e w York: Vintage Books, 1955, 260.

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

34

achieving its ends.

It lives in the relative and abhors absolutes.

In The Plague, Camus discusses the problems of political action
and revolution in avoiding committing the very sins they aim to irradicate.

In the novel, two men are drawn together in a rare experience

of friendship by their awareness that each, in his own way, is fight
ing against the same disease.

In taking care of the sick, Dr. Rieux

has been closely associated with Tarrou, who has organized the citi
zens into groups of emergency workers.
Tarrou had believed that the society in which he lived was based
upon the death sentence and that in seeking to tear it down, he would
be fighting against murder.

Hence, he joined a political group which

was dedicated to the ideal of setting up a better society.

He realized

that their program of action occasionally resulted in condemning cer
tain people to death, and he found it hard to accept that fact.

How

ever, his companions persuaded him that these few had to die in order
that there might be a world where for the rest of time there would be
no death sentences.
firing squad.

Then came, the day when he saw a man killed by a

Suddenly he realized that during all those years when

he sincerely believed that he was fighting against the plague, he too,
was one of those who had the plague and was spreading its contagion.
Here Tarrou discovers that we are all infected with the plague.
Patriotism in America means death for children in Vietnam and our sin
cere efforts to bring a better and peaceful life to all men results
in destruction and death, to men of goodwill an>d ill will alike.

He

concludes that there, are only pestilences and victims; by refusing to
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side with, the pestilence one may at least be. an innocent murderer, do
ing the least possible harm to men and occasionally perhaps even a little
good.

Thus for Tarrou in the face of evident evil, such as the epidemic

which has struck the city of Oran Cor the Nazi occupation), he will do
what he can to help the victims but will not take part in political
action which infects at the same time that it seeks a vaccine.

Tarrou

is uneasily aware that this course may result in leaving the task of
making history to others.

But, he feels that his own part for attain

ing peace must be sympathy, his morality comprehension.
Tarrou* s position accents the principle idea of The. Rebel, that
the revolution which takes away man's freedom for the sake of absolute
justice is no better than the unjust despotism set up for the purpose
of securing the unlimited freedom of a few.

There are certain absolute,

limits which one cannot trespass in the name of any ideal without there
by corrupting that ideal from within.
Camus' idea of absolute limits is tied up with the idea of a human
nature or essence.

When he says that there are limits which men must

observe, he is declaring that all men share an absolute value.

To

this extent, he is holding that essence precedes existence and thereby
rejects Sartre's position that m an is totally free to create his own
limitations.

However, this absolute value does not allow for the forma

tion of systems or ideologies.

It assumes the absolute value of the

human person over all things including all other absolutes.

Thus Camus

stands with Sartre in opposing the Christians, Hegelians, and Marxists,
whose doctrines or original sin, the Absolute Idea, and economic de
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terminism all subordinate the individual to an historical process which
is in some part outside him.
Yet, Tarrou is not identical with Camus.

Rieux is more realistic

than Tarrou in that he rejects Tarrou*s struggle to obtain an impossible
innocence.

He believes that the best man can do is struggle against

death and meaninglessness which are the structure of the human condi
tion.

Here, Rieux expresses Camus* belief that man must struggle if

he is to be truly a man.

He cannot refrain from rebellion as Tarrou

has done.
In

The R ebel, Camus' doctrine of pure revolt shows an interweav

ing of ideas derived from

Rieux and Tarrou both.

The rebel realizes

that for him the only alternative to the acceptance of oppression and
injustice is a calculated culpability.

He will not work in the name

of party or principle which seeks to justify murder as expedient, but
he realizes that in life today one cannot act or even refuse to act
without risking or consenting to the death of others just as the con
scientious objector tacitly consents to the horror of war by cooper
ating in the system that spawns war even though he himself does not
kill.

Therefore he cherishes, like Tarrou, the hope that he may be

an innocent murderer.

But the greater emphasis on action and the spe

cific nature of this calculated culpability suggest Rieux more than

1
Tarrou.

In The Rebel, Camus

says:

If revolt could found a philosophy it would be
a philosophy of limits., of calculated ignorance,
and of risk.
The man who cannot know eyerything cannot kill everything.

1loc. cit., 257.
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Here we find a connection between right conduct and clear-sightendess.
But this time it is the rebel's Socratic knowing that he does not know
which makes him realize that he cannot treat living men as expendable
for the sake of men yet to be born.

The rebel, like Rieux, realizes that

in preferring to serve man rather than God he must not make the mis
take of trying to become God.

He remains faithful to his original

principles, willing to abide by the primary rule of today which Camus^
has phrased as:

"Learn to live and to die, and in order to be a man,

refuse to be God."
Perhaps the truth of the matter is that Tarrou and Rieux repre
sent two aspects of Camus himself.

On the one hand, there is the thirst

for purity of heart and the feeling that it is wrong to compromise with
any society or with any party which permits the sacrifice of individuals
for the good of the majority; on the other hand is the realization that
preoccupation with one's own innocence and retreat from the world form
one more way of consenting to the evils which already exist.

If men

are to be saved, Camus admits there must be rebellions; but if the
revolutionary,

movement is not to destroy both men and principles, he

insists that it must preserve the rebel at its heart.
In The Plague, the two methods are symbolically reconciled.

Rieux

and Tarrou recognize their differences, but each of them sympathetically
comprehends what the other wants.

In this moment of comprehension

both men feel a strange happiness which comes when two human beings
understand one another's differences, accept them, and tolerate one

3-loc. cit., 277.
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another in a short reprieve they had been granted from the intolerances
and evils of the disease.

This situation is the balanced tension of

the bow which Camus has created in his political philosophy as the best
possible situation for the rebel and his momentary escape from the
plague.
In sum, Camus affirms the right of rebellion but is concerned
that it might be carried to some extreme denying the very principle
of individual freedom for w h ich it stands.
rebellion to contain limits and moderation.

Therefore he calls for
This rebellion must be

an individual thing and not part of a mass, organized social movement.
It is the simple action of the individual who, because of a troubled
conscience due to the "wrong" action of his state, merely ceases to
support or cooperate with those things with which he disagrees.

Po

litical action is to be avoided because it tends to adopt the evils
of the system it opposes and often calls for the sacrifice of the in
dividual in its search for freedom for all.

Violence is only to be

tolerated when it is used to oppose some other extreme violence.
is to be avoided whenever possible.

It

Rebellion must preserve the spirit

of the rebel by leaving room for differences and deviations in its
attempts to create a new order.

Ultimately, rebellion must seek some

balanced tension between freedom and justice similar to the spirit of
two individuals who accept their differences but tolerate one another
and commune in harmony and friendship and understanding.
It is. difficult to discuss the philosophy of liberal existen
tialists because they are a small minority of existentialist thought

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

39

and have only one influential leader.

That leader is Sartre who, un

like Camus, presents a philosophy which appears to contain conserva
tive as well as liberal elements.
Sartre began as a conservative but now champions a more liberal
position.

As a conservative, Sartre was more conservative than most

religious and secular existentialists whom we have labled conservative.
To hiffi,^ the permanent state of man’s social relations is conflict.
Its origin lies in the human inability to fuse two subjects into a
harmonious whole.

This is a radical individualism more conservative

toward the possibility of constructive social action than any other
existentialist.

It is a war of every man against every other man.

In

addition, he found man to always act in an historical situation which
is unique, a fact which gives unpredictable content to man's creation.
Thus men can only work together temporarily to overcome a third antag
onistic force.

Once that force is overcome they will war with each

other.
At this state, Sartre opposes Marxism with its reliance on mass
revolution to solve social ills.

To him, man is only what he is and

his authentic existence can only be realized in deeds which are com
mitted alone, in absolute freedom and responsibility.
existence carried no meaning beyond itself,

For him, human

Man exists solely for

himself and his own task which is to live his own existence to its
highest fulfillment.
Sartre's philosophy of rebellion is based on the premise that all

^"Sartre, op. cit,, p. 221.
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men are by nature free.

We can see this truth, he claims, In the fact

that men are capable of recognizing oppression as distinct from other
kinds of afflictions.
storms or earthquakes.

One rebels against men or Gods but not against
The guiding ideal of revolution, to Sartre, should

be respect for the freedom of all men and the factual liberation of all.
Revolution does not aim at bestowing upon certain minorities privileges
which have been previously denied them.
men and for the good of all.

It must be in the name of all

Sartre's ideal revolutionary looks on

any society as merely a human fact which he may accept or try to change.
Sartre has summarized the essentials of his philosophy of revolu
tion into four basic principles which are consistent with. both his
conservative and liberal positions.
his existence is contingent.

First, man is unjustifiable and

No providence has designed his being,

nor was he himself ever free not to exist or not to be free.

Second,

since there is no external justification for individuals, this means
that no collective order which men may establish has any priviledged
claim to "rightness".

Men may at will surpass any such order in the

direction of other orders.

Third, the system of values prevalent in

any society reflects the social structure of that society and tends
to preserve it.

Fourth, as a natural consequence, men may always seek

to go beyond an existing set of values toward other new values which
are anticipated and even invented by men's very effort to pass beyond
the present society.
This Sartrian philosophy of revolution allows for a continual
transcendence, always in the direction of greater freedom and an open
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future.

Even if the ideal of maximum freedom for all could be real

ized by one generation, it would have to be reformulated by the next,
in order to remain freedom.

Moreover, the belief that m en are free

leads Sartre to reject completely what he calls the materialist myth.
Men are not things.
of history.

They are not subject to determinism by obscure forces

Economic determinism is just as much a myth as determinism

by heredity or environment.
class.

A person cannot be defined just by his

Individual members have individual reactions.

Most important

of all, no results of men's actions can be guaranteed, neither their
actual working out, nor their effect on other men, nor the judgment
which the future will pass upon them.

For all these reasons, Sartre

argues that m e n must not be sacrificed either to a mystic idea of the
state or to a vague utopian future.
Sartre began to develop bis ne w liberalism in 1952.

His shift

from a conservative to a liberal existentialist was completed as he
came, to conceive existentialism as an ideology with the sole purpose
of rejuvinating the teachings of Marx.

When the conversion was com

pleted, Sartre expected existentialism, having done its work, to sim
ply disappear.

His book, Critique of Dialectical Reason, was intended

to hasten that disappearance,
Hughes^- argues that Sartre, in his Critique of Dialectical Reason,
began to abandon the individual as he n o w saw that freedom became actual
only when men grouped themselves together for mutual assistance.

It

is here that Sartre's revolutionary romanticism begins to shift his

^op. cit., p. 49.
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philosophy of revolt,

Hughes1 quotes him as speaking of terror as

"the very bond of fraternity."

He now abandoned his earlier affirma

tion that m a n could act only alone and celebrated the moment of
"apocalypse" when a series of isolated individuals fused into a group
inspired by a single aim.

In this new view, Sartre found revolution

ary violence to be both inevitable and moral, that is, in conformity
with history.

Thus, in contrast to his conservative mood, he now

sanctioned the sacrifice of life or liberty in the service of a promised
future.
The n e w Sartre has shifted from his own previous thought and tradi
tional existentialist thought regarding revolt in three ways;

0-).. he

came to view his existentialism as an ideology while conservative exis
tentialists oppose the concept of ideology as confining man to a par
ticular world view,

(21 he began to abandon the individual by reveal

ing a new appreciation of group activities and placing long term goals
over current individual interests and, (3) he affirmed the value of
violence which conservative existentialists opposed except in extreme
circumstances.

It is these three significant differences that distin

guish the liberal existentialists from traditional or conservative
existentialist thought.
Liberal existentialism has proven to b e w e a k for two reasons.
First, Sartre shows a great deal of instability and uncertainty in
his w o r k and appears to vaccilate between traditional and liberal
existentialist thought.

^oc.

l£ is difficult to discover exactly w h i c h

cit., p. 51.
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position, tie actually holds and the reader is often uncertain as. to
whether Sartre is sure of himself.

After publication of his Critique

of Dialectical Reason, he published The Words in which he appears to
refute m u c h of his Marxian treatise, particularly bis ideological com
mitment,

Thus, his true position seems unclear.

Second, Sartre's new existentialism extends revolution tp such
a scope that one can seriously question whether it remains existen
tialism.

His abandonment of the individual for the discovery of a

new freedom in group activities and his tendency to place long term
goals over current individual interests is a serious break with exis
tentialism.

Existentialism has traditionally insisted that the freedom

of the individual to choose his own possibilities in freedom is the
foundation of the existentialist philosophy.

In view of Sartre's new

positions, it may be that liberal existentialism is not existential
ism at all and that the new Sartre, as Hughes"^" contends, "belongs with
the ideologists of the previous century."

Consequently, liberal exis

tentialism has few followers and only one leader, Sartre himself.
reality, Sartre is liberal existentialism.

In

Without him, it would not

exist.
Unlike the new Sartre, most existentialists distrust revolutions
because in their attempt to inject ideas into history and to reshape
the world to fit a theoretical structure, they are likely to shove
mankind into a strict system denying him his freedom.

If revolution

ists are to succeed, they must have, power and to get it they kill both

^ibid.
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men and principles.

Revolt, on the other hand, is an incoherent but

specific impulse which remains faithful to its origins.

It is less

a program for action than a testing stoneagainst which allconduct,
action, or passivity, must be measured.

To most existentialists, revo

lutions tend to justify all in the name of efficiency.
Camus, seeks rather to be effective.

Revolt, says

He^"went on to say:

When the end is absolute - that is, historically
speaking, when one believes it to be certain —
then one can go so far as to sacrifice others.
When it is not, one can sacrifice only oneself
in a struggle where the common dignity is at
stake. Does the end justify the means? Possi
bly, yes..But what will justify the end? To
this question which historic thought leaves dan
gling, revolt answers — the means.
The general consensus of existentialists is that no collective
order has any exclusive claim to rightness and man may ligitimately
seek new values to pass beyond the present society.

This is the role

of the rebel who by creative insight and application dares to reject
authority and bring change to society.

Revolution is wrong when it

sacrifices human beings for some future ideal or the good of the ma
jority but retreat from the world merely gives tacit consent to the
world as it is.

To traditional existentialists, society must find a

place within it for the rebel if it is to allow freedom and creativity.
In conclusion, it appears clear that existentialists find moral
ity to be situational in terms of individual decisions rather than
absolute.

Thus the state may not exercise its obligatory powers in

^op. cit., p. 261.
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the name of any supreme value or ethical system.

To remain an auth

entic man, it is necessary to reject the authority of society and to
seek change.

Change must come through individual and non—violent re

bellion rather than through revolution which tends to sacrifice indi
vidual freedom for the public good.
mous.

Freedom and rebellion are synony

To.rebel against restraints is to create a new and authentic

self which is the antithesis of the restrictive society.
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CHAPTER IV
FREEDOM IN ANARCHY

Awareness of the existentialist emphasis upon rebellion raises
questions of interest to political science and of special concern to
those interested in the concept of freedom.

What is the result of the

existentialist rebellion and what are its implications in the context
of large-scale rebellion?

If such rebellion results in the destruc

tion of society, will anarchy prove as detrimental as organization
to freedom?

In this new anarchy, will the necessities of freedom to

live and freedom to move such as sewage disposal and highways be de
stroyed?

Is civilization possible in such anarchy?

An evaluation

of existentialist literature gives us clues to these questions.
It seems clear that the end result of rebellion on a large scale
would be the destruction of society and the state as we know them by
denying the state the right to enforce collective action even though

1
the ultimate goal might be good.

Camus

is representative of exis

tentialist thought as he insists that only one yardstick may be used
to measure human action.

That standard is respect for the ultimate

value of the human being himself.

The individual is the prime con

cern and freedom to become authentic the goal. Existentialists find
collective action, by its very nature, to crush individual aspirations
in subjection to the public and therefore would free the individual
from any obligation to society as an institution or system.

To them,

■^op. cit., p. 261.
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the deviant who does not attempt to enforce his will on others should
be free to act as he wishes, free of any obligation or duty to insti
tutions representing the collective authority of the public.
This new anarchy existentialists call for would be a post state,
post religious (in an organized sense), post ethical, post judicial,
post moral, and post ideological era.

It would abandon all formulas

for the classification or the clarification of the relationship of
men.

Following Nietzsche's assertion that all things are options,

existentialism would have no law and no possible method of describing
an unacceptable act in its new anarchy.

There would be no citizen's

action or social activity which would be prohibited.
It is now clear that the non-society of existentialist thought
is completely alien to the mainstream of political thought.

Its sym

pathies lie with the nihilism of the Cynics and the thought of anarch
ists who have opposed the state and society.

Any form of compulsory

collective action must be abandoned as law withers away in favor of
the social anarchy of the n ew order.

This social anarchy does not

mean license nor does it mean the absence of cooperation.
orderly anarchy for only the coercive element is abolished.

It is an
The door

is open for an orderly community based on wholehearted cooperation and
voluntary adherence to customs or traditions while allowing all men
the necessary freedom to be creative, to live authentically, and to
develop their individual selfhoods.

In this ideal community the tra

ditions accepted are under constant scrutiny and are reevaluated by
each individual and each generation to maximize freedom for all.
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It is this fluid society of orderly anarchy toward which all existen
tialists move.
At this point a distinction between the terms "society" and "com
munity" is in order.

Williams^ conceptualizes the distinction through

the thought of Ferdinand Toennies who founded two types of societies:
Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft.

Toennies identified Gemeinschaft as

the type of society which has grown organically through generations
into a unity.

It is homogeneous and characterized by a natural alle

giance shown to the traditionally established customs, morals, and
beliefs of such a community.

Unlike GemeLnschaft, Gesellschaft is seen

by Toennies as an aggregation of people living together because they
find it useful to do so.

This society might be called a consumer's

organization as the institutions of this group have been arranged by
the members with a view to their individual wishes.

Thus, to Toennies,

Gemeinschaft is an organic unity while Gesellschaft or society is an
artificial one created by man for specific purposes.
Existentialists would view contemporary society as a Gesellschaft.
Their best possible social situation is comparable to Gemeinschaft.
To them, only a community of individuals relating to one another as
seekers of authentic existence is free.

Negative freedom or freedom

from state restrictions is only half of the battle.

The false belief

that liberal society is true freedom lulls one into forgetting that
the norms and standards of the Gesellschaft and the creation of mass
man also limits one's freedom to become an authentic person.

Only in

op. cit., p. 48.
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the ordered anarchy of the Gemeinschaft can man escape submergence
into the public and establish one's own identity yet relate to others.
Existentialists have shown two basic attitudes toward the possi
bility of establishing an ordered anarchy or contemporary Gemeinschaft.
Non-religious existentialists find ordered anarchy to be a goal man can
never reach but toward which he should always strive.

Religious exis

tentialists find ordered anarchy to be both possible and necessary to
the fulfillment of man.

Yet, the ordered anarchy they seek is basic

ally a spiritual and therefore non-concrete community.

That is, faith

in God and a wholehearted cooperation of community members to become
authentic existences creates true community or community in God.

Once

community in God has been achieved, the question of whether to have
a Gesellschaft or Gemeinschaft community in the sense of non-spiritual
relationships is secondary and therefore receives little attention.
In seeking Gemeinschaft, Buber^ finds human existence to be intrin
sically a life of relationships the most important of which is the '1Thou"relationship.

The meeting of the "I" with a "Thou" challenges

the "I" to become truly human in a relationship between two real per
sons.

The free man overcomes the "I-Itf'relationship of Gesellschaft to

establish the'T-Thou"re.lationship of ordered anarchy.

Freedom means

to meet one's destiny and to strive continually to establish the "IThou" relation and through it authentic self.
Buber’s Gemeinschaft grows out of the free decision of authentic
persons.

The new ordered anarchy must be established without destroy-

^"Buber, Martin, Paths in Utopia.

New York: Macmillan, 1950, 26.
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ing the personal independence which man has achieved by centuries of
struggle.

Community must be based on the mutual recognition of the

dignity of the individual person which in turn demands free persons
working together in voluntary cooperation.
Marcel^" also considers man's relationship with other persons to
be a gateway to the experience of freedom and a necessity for its very
emergence.

It is by blocking genuine relationships that society may

restrict man's freedom.

Once freedom is defined and the threat to

freedom established, Marcel seeks to escape the restrictions of society
in a spiritual sense through the love of God.

Like Kierkegaard and

all religious existentialists, the best hope for Gemeinschaft that he
can offer is that man will eventually awaken to his peril and seek the
authentic life.

In the meantime, those who are aware of the situation

will find psychological freedom in faith in God even though their physical
actions must conform to society.

Hopefully, when enough men awake to

this peril, society will slowly disintegrate as men withdraw their
allegiance from false government and abstract society and reformulate
their relationships based on total freedom for all in ordered anarchy.
2

Berdyaev
community.

also recognizes the distinction between society and

To h i m , everybody's decision for or against freedom in his

own life determines the course the future will take.

The end is the

common task of all men, rather than an event mankind passively waits

^Marcel, Gabriel, The Philosophy of Existence.
sophical Library, 1949, 107.

New York: Philo

2

Berdyaev, op. cit., p. 59.
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Every creative work, of man is a contribution to the final trans

formation of the world toward ordered anarchy.

Man is put into a field

of tension between the old and the new, the Gesellschaft and his par
ticipation in the realm of freedom.

Berdyaev demands with Kierkegaard

that m an must either live from the ground of o ne’s being Cfreedom) or
become separated from God in a life given to the world of Gesellschaft.
Berdyaev, then, seeks to establish a Gemeinschaft community as
a free union of men in the spirit of brotherhood.

For him, freedom

is exercise of creativity and free thinking rising above the conform
ity of m o d e m society and is to be experienced in a Gemeinschaft re
lationship with others.

Thus Berdyaev advocates an anarchic community

for the social life of man but, like other religious existentialists,
it is an ordered anarchism.
It becomes clear that the approach of the religious existential
ists to intersubjective relations and community does not clearly develop
a structure or form of government or method of revolution to bring men
complete freedom in the objective world.

Indeed, this would be a viola

tion of existentialist teachings which deny the value of systems and
fixed principles and find them to be evil.

Buber does suggest a new

form of decentralized society but does not give us concrete guidelines
to shift society from its contemporary form.

Berdyaev raised the

possibility of a spiritual anarchy and Kierkegaard, Marcel, and Jaspers
all look to some shift in m a n ’s relationship to other men as well as
society through love based on faith in God.
clear plan of action to achieve these goals.

Yet, no one presents a
Ordered anarchy will only
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come when all men seek authentic existence and rebel against society.
It appears that once the injustices of organized society have been
exposed, religious existentialists are helpless to alleviate that prob
lem in the objective world and thus seek true authenticity in subjec
tivity.

In general, religious existentialists echo the hope of Kierke

gaard that their writings will awaken some men to the crisis of exis
tence and cause them to seek authenticity by becoming more tolerant
in the objective world while finding freedom for themselves in the
subjective.

Coupled with this possibility of subjective freedom for

the individual is the possibility of authentic existence.

Perhaps the

chains of confinement in the objective world will slowly wither away,
not by violent revolution but by lack of use as a new tolerance and a
new era will occur not only for subjective man but for his objective
reality as well.
Heidegger and Sartre represent the thought of existentialists
not committed to God or faith on intersubjective relations and perfect
community.

Sartre is an athiest while Heidegger is an agnostic.

Heidegger"*" found men to live together for economic purposes but
not within the existentialist concept of perfect community.

Instead,

men exploit one another in the process of becoming existents.

Sartre

pursues this analysis of man as a social being which Heidegger had
begun.

He

2

goes on to criticize religious existentialists for fail

ure to recognize that Gemeinschaft or ordered anarchy is impossible.

^Heidegger, Being and Existence, o p . cit., p . 107.
O

Sartre, Being and Nothingness, op. cit., pp. 246—71.
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To him, they adequately discuss the influence of the fear of being
different and mass media on the individual but do not account for the
reciprocal relation of recognition and struggle which results when the
individual is confronted by another individual being as opposed to
the average or the abstract.

This is because they have failed to come

to grips with the problem of intersubjectivity.

To Sartre, this prob

lem negates any possibility of the community religious existentialist's
hope to find through faith in God as men are inevitably in conflict
and thus cannot relate constructively in an ordered anarchy.
Sartre-*- discusses the subjective self and its relation to the
social object which he calls alter.

Alter is another existing being

who views the individual and judges him.
also sees me.
for Sartre.

This reciprocal relationship is of the utmost importance
It is only when man is looked at by another person that

he becomes an object.
else.

He is someone I see but who

He is only an object in the presence of someone

In his own consciousness he does not treat himself as an object,

To illustrate this, Sartre

2

takes the example of shame.

Han experiences

the feeling of shame, of being ashamed of himself, by virtue of having
performed some act seen by another.

Shame is by nature recognition.

Man recognizes who he is after alter views him.

Shame is the shame

of the self before alter.
The significance of alter is that no comprehension of being is
possible without taking into account the relation of being with that
of alter.

Were there no alter, man would never experience himself as

1
loc. cit., p. 281.

2

loc. cit., p. 306.
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an object.

In that sense, alter negates the self as a subject.

This

negation of the individual by alter results In conflict.
Sartre finds conflict to be the essence of all intersubjective
relations.

It is this concept of conflict that negates the possibility

for Sartre and Heidegger of the ideal community of the religious exis
tentialists.
freedom.

Sartre views subjective consciousness as unconditioned

To him'*’ the authentic being is an absolutely free agent who

makes himself what he is.

The self is the only transcendent in the

world of being and its freedom is the unique source of values.

How

ever, his freedom is. placed in jeopardy by the presence of other, for
in looking at and regarding m e as an object, alter petrifies my self
into a thing among other things.

Once objectified, man loses his freedom.

Thus all men are in danger of becoming annihilated by their fellow man.
People do not exist together.
object.

Man must be either the subject or the

Once objectified, he must liberate himself from the grip of

the other to regain his freedom.
object.

However, alter has also become an

The result is a dynamic, reciprocal struggle.

Each man must

reduce the freedom of others (their existence as an ego) to a state
of subordination if he wishes to regain his own freedom.
Thus, for Sartre, social relations consist of a battle to the
death where there is no victory for one or the other.
uous and unbreakable circle of conflict.

It is

a contin

Sartre does leave room for

cooperation but this cooperation is fa.r from the cooperation of selves
in Gemeinschaft relating together in a harmonious search, for authen
ticity.

Cooperation is a struggle by two or more m e n against a third

1loc. cit., p. 722.

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

55

party that viewed them both as objects.
For Sartre, man is not a means to an end as Heidegger described
him.

He is a block, standing between man and his goal.

You may coop

erate for a short time in order to annihilate another person or body
of persons, but in the final outcome it is still you against every
other particular person.

When all others become objects in your con

sciousness, then you are free to exist.

Consequently, Sartre's view

on intersubjective relationships becomes to be virtually identical
with the Hobbesian notion of the war-of-all-against-all.

Every con

sciousness is in potential conflict with every other consciousness.

1
His-social philosophy is summarized best in his

own play, No Ex i t .

"Hell is others."
We have distinguished between religious and non-religious exis
tentialists and may conclude that religious existentialists seek auth
entic existence in freedom through some transcendent reality wholly
other than the reality of the empirical world.
ultimate reality God.

Kierkegaard calls this

Buber calls it the "I-Thou" relationship and

Jaspers calls it Transcendence.

The essential point is that these

existential thinkers see the freedom of man grounded in something
greater than the individual.

To them, perfect community is possible

as all men find faith in God or ultimate reality.

As all men find

faith in God and communicate with their fellows subjectively and auth
entically as God's coworkers this subjective freedom will become snyonymous with the objective world and perfect community will exist at

‘'"Sartre, Jean-Paul, No E x i t . .New York: Samuel French, 1958,52.
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all levels of human comprehension.

However, the religious existential

ists offer no plan of action to bring all men to accept God.

Rather,

they merely hope that this miracle will eventually occur bringing a
gradual withering away of the state and society to be replaced by an
ever growing community of God's coworkers.
In contrast, the non-religious existentialist denies any possi
bility of reaching perfect community.

Perfect community rests upon

the assumption held by religious existentialists that men may relate
to one another in a constructive and even holy manner creating a com
munity where fear and jealousy and conflict are absent and yet indi
vidual authenticity is preserved.

Non-religious existentialists deny

the possibility of any such community by insisting that individuals
find it necessary to combat other individuals as well as society to
preserve their authenticity.
Religious existentialists follow the lead of earlier theologians
who often resented the obligative relationship of man to the state but
found it necessary and of little importance beside the future society
of God toward which every Christian must direct his concern.

Conse

quently, life was seen more as a vale of tears which must be endured
in one's journey to God and rebellion to a new freedom on earth was not
viewed with the concern of modern atheistic existentialists.

Augustine

exemplifies the thought of many earlier Christians in his belief that
the protection of the state and the material benefits of an organized
and lawful society free of violence is the only joy on the non-elected.
To him, the elected citizen must endure this regulation on earth for
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the good of the condemned until final judgment and the Kingdom of
Heaven.
Likewise, w i t h freedom found in some notion of a reality grounded
in something greater than the individual, the radical concept of rebel
lion seen in Sartre and the plea for social action by Camus will not
be so great in the religious existentialists and less emphasis will
be placed on rebellion from actual political authority in the empirical
world than on achieving transcendence.

This means that the religious

existentialists, on the whole, will spend much time philosophically
discussing the evils of restrictive systems, standardization and forced
conformity but will be unlikely to translate this fear into actual life
situations and unlikely to recommend physical rebellion against the
state or any aspect of it.

In effect, religious existentialists are

much more conservative in working toward change in the objective world
than are non-religious existentialists.
Therefore, we may conclude that existentialists do not seriously
expect the Gemeinschaft community of ordered anarchy to replace Gesell
schaft.

Non-religious existentialists find perfect community impossible

and religious existentialists believe that perfect community must first
develop i.n terms of a spiritual relationship in God before it i.s ex
tended to include the activities of daily life.
Extentialists are not idealists and realize that the n ew social
order (or lack of it) may never come into existence.

For this reason,

they do not insist that society make changes to wh i c h it is yiolently
opposed (Sartre in his radical moods is an exception).

Instead, exis-
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tentialists seek limited goals in the form of more tolerance and the
removal of as many coercive restrictions as possible.

They do this

by refraining from the support of political parties or institutions
or any movement requiring subjection of the self to a principle and
by using existentialist literature and their personal social action
or nonaction as an example to encourage others to join the long process
of ultimately destroying the coercive, confirming, and organizational
aspects of society.

They place their hopes on a gradual breakdown of

society and claim to see it coming in a lessening of sexual restric
tions and a general loosening of restrictions in social relations as
segments of society grow more tolerant.
In sum, the social anarchy of existentialism Is to be character
ized by the absence of the state, law, ideology, morals, or any other
system that restricts the individual; tolerance toward others and an
openness to new ideas and creativity; respect for individual freedom
and autonomy as the governing principle; and a continual re-evaluation
of human relationships by each individual.

For the present, the in

ability to achieve orderly anarchy requires existentialists to restrict
their activities to achieving the best possible order.

Thus they will

continue to work for more tolerance and freedom and do whatever possi
ble to bring ahout a gradual weaking of the power or desire of the state
and society to enforce conformity.
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CHAPTER V
THE EXISTENTIALIST AS SOCIAL CRITIC

The issue of freedom occupies the center of modern political thought.
Existentialism is a philosophy which deals with the scope of our aware
ness of freedom and limitations upon that freedom.

It seeks to explain

the human condition by clarifying the fundamental problems of human
existence and prescribes a basic end.
The prohlems. of freedom today for citizens and governments is no
small thing.

The questions relating to the draft, black depression,

civil disobedience, and campus regimentation all involve conflicting
concepts of the nature and content of human freedom.
Existentialists join liberals, to support the maximim possible ex
tension of negative freedom.

Indeed, existentialism is the most thor

oughgoing philosophy of individualism in our time.

It champions the

spontaneity of the individual menaced by society and the state and
seeks to safeguard the dignity, rights, initiatives, even the vagaries
of the autonomous personality against any oppressive authority, organ
ized movement or established institution.

With individual liberty as

its watchword, existentialism is a creed for nonconformism.
tion, existentialists seek psychological freedom.

In addi

They are averse to

routine, externally imposed ideas or disciplined modes of behavior,
and whatever is uncongenial to the desire of the ego.

All submission

to pressures and presences not freely chosen is evidence of "bad faith."
The targets of existentialist protest are as diversified as the
interests and inclinations of its exponents.

These have ranged from
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religious orthodoxies to philosophical systematizing, from capitalist
exploitation to Stalinist regimentation, from hourgeois morality to
worker’s bureaucratism.

Kierkegaard set about to disturb the peace

of mind of the hypocritical Danish, middle class. Nietzsche heralded
the superman who was to rise above the herdlike crowd and transcend
good and evil.
outsiders.

The favored heroes of Camus and Sartre are rebels and

Simone de Beauvoir and Sartre analyze writers like the

Marquis de Sad and Jean Genet whose ideas and lives have outrageously
flouted the ordinary canons of moral conduct.
However, the critical observer will note that the existentialists
do not always succeed in shedding completely the values of the society
they rebel against.

Kierkegaard assailed the sluggishness and self-

deception of the smug citizens around him only to embrace the Christain
God with more passionate intensity.

Sartre, who attacks stuffed shirts

and stinkers for their egotism, clings to the concept of the totally
free person beholden solely to himself as the pivot of his philosophy
and moral theory-

Existentialism proclaims the urge of the individual

to develop without hindrance.

Yet, its aversion to organized action

of mass movements, determined by historically given circumstances ren
ders it incapable of finding the effective solution of the problem for
the bulk of humanity.

For this reason, it would be justified to label

existentialism a nonconformative rather than a revolutionary theory.
In other words, this theory of individualism seems only workable in
the smallest of societies and applicable to the most creative and in
tellectually capable individuals.

It may be that we need more than what
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the existentialist is providing.

Perhaps the philosophy of existen

tialism is as antiquated in mass society as the thought of Plato and
Aristotle was to life beyond the polis.
A strong argument can be made that it is the individual rather
than society which is the abstraction.

Everything distinctive of

man, from toolmaking, speech, and thought of the latest triumphs of
art and technology, are the products of his collective activity over
the past million years.

Take away from the person all the socially

conditioned and historically acquired attributes derived from the cul
ture of the collectivity and little would be left but the biological
animal.

It may be argued that the specific nature of the individual

is at least partially determined by the wealth of his social connec
tions..

This would apply, then, not only to his contacts with the out

side world but to the innermost fibers of his being:
imagination, and ideas.

his emotions,

Existentialists do not deal adequately with

this problem.
It is questionable, then, whether existentialism as a non-conformist
philosophy for individuals
change and political action.

can provide an adequate method of social
Since the social structure shapes and

dominates the lives of individuals, it is logical to assume that only
a collective struggle is capable of eliminating the conditions that
repress individuality and create an environment suited to the unhampered
cultivation of the capacities of each living human being.

The noncon

formist activities of individual existentialists may accomplish spiritual
and limited material freedom for each individual rebel, but it is diffi
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cult to imagine how the example or witness of a creative and articulate
minority can possibly motivate the masses as individuals.

Yet, if

change is accomplished through the leadership of masses or classes,
the individual will again he crushed by the impersonal and the goal
of existentialism as a free society for each individual member will
again be crushed in the mechanism of mass organization.
According to its supporters, the supreme merit of existentialism
is its capacity to explain and safeguard man's freedom.

In this con

cern for freedom existentialism merges with a basic ingredient of
our contemporary political situation, the liberal dream of a world in
which a free man lives in a free society.

The problem has been how to

understand this mysterious and seemingly bottemless liberty and how to
put it into everyday reality.
Existentialists, in reality espousing a philosophy of noncon
formism rather than social revolution, are more concerned about the
narrow dilemmas of personal responsibility than with the broader prob
lem of the interaction of freedom and necessity in social evolution.
The ethics of existentialism is uncompromisingly libertarian.

The

individual creates both, himself and his morality through his uncurbed
choices.

Authentic freedom manifests and fulfills itself in the de

liberate adoption of one's own self.

Thus the works of the existen

tialists concentrate upon such "either-or" situations as whether to
accept God or reject Him.

To join one side rather than the other or to

turn traitor rather than remaining loyal to one's comrades and finally,
to live or to die.
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Although existentialism is not a social philosophy as such, its
common concern for the whole man as the starting point for social theory,
its common fear of the suppression of the individual by society and
its common goal of the ultimate or perfect harmony or society may be
legitimately discussed and analyzed as social theory.

In these common

attitudes and others, it can be affirmed that the basics of the existen
tialist philosophy as social theory or political philosophy is not
pluralistic.

Existentialists agree on these propositions and goals.

However, existentialists are pluralistic in that they take many diver
gent paths in moving out of the original human condition toward that
common good society.

The religious, like Buber and Tillich, try to

find a way to God through harmony or communion between men.

The un

believers seek a solution through a transcendence of the situation
without the aid of communion in God.

This quest has led the most radi

cal of them toward the Marxist philosophy of a revolutionary struggle
of the working class.

Yet, they cannot completely merge themselves

with the aims of any movement because of their stand on the insurmount
able ambiguity of everything and their concern for the individual free
of any coercion or group pressure.
If existentialism exists to move all men to the good society or
authentic life, it remains fundamentally a failure.

Only by treatment

of individuals as part of a group is it possible for all to be reached
and this would destroy the basic principle of existentialism which
finds each individual unique and not to be regarded as part of a group
but free and authentic being.

Therefore, the attempt to lift society
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from what it is to what it should be inevitably falls short of its
realization.

For Camus, every act of rebellion against oppression is

justified but installs a new form of servitude.

For Sartre, the act

of transcendence negates itself in the very process of materialization.
It must be followed by a fresh exertion of creative revolt which in
turn will not reach its goal.
time.

We are swindled by the limitations of

History and death nullify our fondest hopes.
This pessimism tends to overshadow the hope of permanent trans

cendence of communion in God which, could achieve ideal society for the
group.

The expectation that every venture must turn out to be a lost

cause can stimulate spasmodic expenditures of energy in social strug
gle but the expectation of defeat spreads scepticism and cripples the
steadfastness of the inwardly divided individual at every step and weak
ens existentialism as anything beyond social theory.
Existentialism attempts to explain why people now feel that the
major forces governing their lives are inimical and inscrutable and
beyond their capacity to control or change.

This feeling of helpless

ness occurs because men have been dehumanized by the alienations they
suffer in group life.

Alienation expresses the fact that the creations

of m e n ’s mind and hand dominate their creators.

The victims of this

servitude become stripped of the. qualities of self-determination and
self-direction which raise them above the animal level.
For existentialism, man's alienation is a primordial, indestruc-^
tible feature of human existence.

The free and conscious human being

is irreconcilably estranged from the world into which, he has been hurled.
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Although he can introject meaning, value, usefulness to it, this does
not efface its alien and absurd nature.
Since the sources of alienation are ineradicable, we can do no
more than clear-sightedly confront and stoically bear up under this
somber state, trying to cope with it as best we can.

All the diverse

ways in which existentialists seek to transcend their fate, religion,
artistic creation, good works, liberalism, social revolution, are by
their own admission only palliative and superficial.

They may make

life tolerable and meaningful but. do not and cannot end the condition
of alienation.

Free men are obliged to try and overcome their alien

ation in ways most suitable to themselves but their efforts prove un
availing.

This is the melancholy destiny of man.

equivalent to the concept of original sin.

Alienation is the

Instead of indicating any

exit from the state of alienation, existentialism makes it the perma
nent foundation of human life, reproduction, and justifying it in meta
physical terms.
Here we discover a major paradox in existentialism.

We have seen

the roots of a social philosophy built in existentialism explaining
m a n ’s fundamental existence and carefully leaving an opening through
transcendence of his situation to a metaphysical order which has his
torical possibilities.

This ordered anarchy is seen as communion among

men in God or merely transcendence of the life situation to a new under
standing of one's self and other selves.

In this new order each indi

vidual is free to live authentically and an ordered anarchy is estab
lished in which men live and function harmoniously through free choice.
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The law as a coercive instrument of society is no longer present.
However, authentic existence in the harmonious society would seem to
necessitate the elimination of alienation and the conflict of beings.
No indication has been given that communion in God or existence in
the ordered society would leave room for conflict and alienation.

On

the contrary, the reader is led to believe that alienation will be elim
inated in the new ordered anarchy.

Yet, existentialists also have es

tablished alienation as a fact which cannot be overcome.

Apparently,

they cannot decide whether they do or do not want to wait for Gudot.
Also, despite the eternal hopes of men that the ideal or good society
might someday be established, existentialists do not share this view.
Therefore they are troubled by a contradiction between what society
or man's existence is and what it should be.

Individuals may reach

the best possible situation on occasion but by their very nature will
objectify the situation, restore alienation and return to man's natural
state.
Despite their concern for the real world and emphasis upon action,
existentialists fail to see the possibility of establishing universal
freedom for all men.

Instead, the best to be hoped for is spiritual

freedom for the individual who temporarily escapes the restrictions
of society to establish, authentic existence for himself as an individual.
In this sense, existentialism itself becomes a conservative social
philosophy as it substitutes spiritual and mental freedom for the cre
ative individual as a replacement for the ordered anarchy.
This view is not completely fair.

Perhaps existentialism could
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more correctly be labled a realistic philosophy.

It might be called

realistic in the sense that existentialists do not harbor the faintest
hope that utopia will be ushered in to eliminate all the problems of
existence.

First, it recognizes that there will always be those who

avoid the venture and find comfortable shelter in both the old and the
new systems.

Second, existentialists are keenly aware of how incom

plete even m a n ’s most perfect strivings are and, with it, of the ever
present possibility of failure-

This awareness stems from their knowl

edge of the immense mystery which surrounds the human life.

It erects

an insurmountable obstacle to the easy hope of utopia, whether scien
tific, religious, or political.

It also bans finality in any sense

as something man can command.
Existentialists have therefore called on man to abandon the ideas
of a final solution to our practical problems and to our longing for
truth.

Instead of a final solution, the image of the ordered anarchy

is raised as the impossible goal as a challenge to fill our lives with
a genuine search and not to be content w i t h pre-formulated answers and
past accomplishments.

Throughout history, that search alone has evoked

the great and the truly humane in man, while of course the situation
in which it has been carried on has been changing constantly.
a severe prospect, but to the existentialist,

This is

to avoid this experience

is to never have been really born.
Of all the contributions of existentialism to social thought, the
most valuable is its reaffirmation and broadening of our concept of
liberty.

In a period when men feel restricted by the bonds of society

and categorized and specialized by the chains of m o d e m production,
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existentialism calls for reaffirmation of the creative and responsible
man.

It seeks to offer m a n the possibility of negative and psychologi

cal freedom.

Perfect community can only occur when all men are free

and responsible.

Only then does it transcend the level of a tool for

a better standard of living and become a life-fulfilling quest.

The

repercussions of liberty understood in such a dynamic way would be
most vigorous.
The existentialist concept of liberty brings vitality and a sense
of purpose to the individual life.

This is because it implies the need

for the constant overcoming of what man is at a given moment in favor
of a richer personality,

to never be a prisoner to a once-formed self,

a routine world, an easy secondhand life.

Liberty thus becomes linked

to uniqueness and creativity on the part of each of us.

The free per

son can only be.a creative person, creative in the sense of asserting
his uniqueness against all that might destroy it and especially against
his own inclination to be indifferent.
In the last analysis, this means that liberty resides as a poten
tial force only in the individual and cannot be produced by laws, insti
tutions, models, or a natural benevolent force.

It means further that

even in a free society only those are free who valiantly strive after
freedom while the others are slaves of the greatest of enemies, indif
ference.

This existentialist concept of liberty becomes mainly a battle

against human indifference; an indifference which seduces us to seek
the comfort of the faceless mass and destroys our uniqueness in thought
and action by causing us to believe we are still free because we happen
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to

live in a particular society.

This concept of liberty would not

make life more restful but it would certainly be more experimental
because it would open man to empirical experiences and free him from
identification with abstractions.
This would be particularly true of politics.

The field of human

relations in which the fateful organization of the power of one man over
another is established would see the death of the concept of the last
great revolution which would abolish all wrongs and blaze the trail
for the coming of the Kingdom of Heaven on earth.

In its stead would

come a highly dynamic concept of justice tied to man as creative being
with his ideas, ambitions, and yearnings.

The only never changing ele

ment in it will be the presence of free and responsible man.
If finality in the sense of perfect accomplishment is impossible,
what about the finality of existentialist philosophy?

Existentialists

have at no time considered themselves the last prophets of mankind.
But the philosophy of the future will never be able to forget their
revolt against any political philosophy which treats man only in special
aspects.

If nothing else survives of all the existentialists have said,

it will be impossible to forget the utter seriousness with which they
have dealt with human existence.

In a sense this passionate willing

ness to search and find and to witness for the supreme personal experi
ment with o n e ts whole personality is the core of existentialism.

It

forms the basis for authentic existence, is the key to the overcoming
of estrangement to the extent that it may be overcome, and gives the
highest promise for the preservation of free and responsible man.
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